fix(extension): recover the cookies chrome silently filtered out

chrome.cookies.getAll returned only PASSPORT: Chrome checks cookie access
by building a URL from the cookie's Secure flag (secure -> https, plain ->
http) and matching it against host_permissions, so lanhu's non-Secure
user_token/session/SERVERID were dropped without an error. Declare the
http scheme for lanhuapp.com as well, and document that it is load-bearing.

Also merge the page's own document.cookie into the header (content script
forwards it; ecosystem-core owns the merge, privileged source wins on a
name clash), so a narrow privileged query can never make the extension
emit less than the page itself would send. parseDocumentCookie moves from
lanhu-monkey into ecosystem-core; both hosts now share it.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

Author: DaYePython

.changeset/core-merge-page-cookies.md

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+---
+'@lanhu-context/ecosystem-core': minor
+'@lanhu-context/lanhu-monkey': patch
+---
+
+新增 `mergeCookies`，`collectCookieHeader` 接受可选的页面 Cookie 列表：特权 Cookie 源（`chrome.cookies` / `GM_cookie`）与页面 `document.cookie` 合并，同名以特权源为准。`parseDocumentCookie` 从 lanhu-monkey 迁入 core，两端共用同一实现。

.changeset/extension-cookie-scheme-permission.md

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+---
+'@lanhu-context/browser-extension': patch
+---
+
+修复扩展只能复制到一条 Cookie（`PASSPORT`）导致 `lanhu auth test` 失败：`host_permissions` 补上 `http://*.lanhuapp.com/*`。Chrome 按 Cookie 的 `Secure` 标志拼 URL 再匹配 host_permissions（Secure→https，非 Secure→http），蓝湖的 `user_token`/`session`/`SERVERID` 均非 Secure，只声明 https 时会被静默过滤。
+
+同时 content script 会把页面的 `document.cookie` 随消息交给 service worker，与 `chrome.cookies` 合并后再拼 Cookie 头，确保特权查询变窄时扩展也不会比页面本身能发出的 Cookie 更少。

ecosystem/browser-extension/CLAUDE.md

@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ pnpm vitest run ecosystem/browser-extension               # 本包仅剩消息
 - **token 安全**（继承根 CLAUDE.md）：整段 Cookie 等同账号凭据。测试与文档一律用 `sid=FAKE` 类占位符，绝不出现真实 Cookie；日志/toast 不回显 token 内容。
 - **crx 签名 key 同凭据级**：key 决定扩展 ID，换 key 等于换扩展。本地 `key.pem` 与一切 `*.pem`/`*.crx` 已被根 .gitignore 拦截，绝不入库；CI 从 repo secret `LANHU_EXT_CRX_KEY` 读取（缺失时 workflow 明确报错，不静默跳过）。manifest 版本号唯一事实源是 package.json（changesets 管理），`public/manifest.json` 里的 version 只是占位，构建时被 `scripts/build.ts` 覆写。
 - **manifest 权限最小化**：`cookies` + `clipboardWrite`，`host_permissions` 仅 `*.lanhuapp.com` 与 `127.0.0.1`；新增权限需先在 README「权限说明」给出理由。
+- **`host_permissions` 的 `http://*.lanhuapp.com/*` 不是冗余，删了会静默丢 Cookie**：Chrome 按 Cookie 的 `Secure` 标志拼 URL 再匹配 host_permissions（Secure→`https://`，非 Secure→`http://`）。蓝湖只有 `PASSPORT` 是 Secure，`user_token`/`session`/`SERVERID` 都不是——只留 https 时 `chrome.cookies.getAll` 只返回 `PASSPORT` 一条且不报错（2026-08 实测）。油猴无此问题是因为 Tampermonkey 自带全站权限。
+- **Cookie 采集是两个来源合并**：service worker 的 `chrome.cookies`（唯一能拿 HttpOnly 的来源）+ content script 随消息带上的 `document.cookie`（`BackgroundMessage.pageCookie`），在 core 的 `mergeCookies` 里同名以前者为准。保留页面这一路的意义：权限或分区导致特权查询变窄时，扩展至少不会比页面本身能发出的 Cookie 还少。
 
 ## 权威文档
 

ecosystem/browser-extension/README.md

@@ -69,7 +69,11 @@ lanhu auth test "<设计稿URL>"
 ## 权限说明
 
 - `permissions`: `cookies`（读取 lanhuapp.com Cookie，含 HttpOnly——这正是做成扩展而非油猴脚本的原因）、`clipboardWrite`
-- `host_permissions`: 仅 `https://*.lanhuapp.com/*` 与 `http://127.0.0.1/*`，不触达其他站点
+- `host_permissions`: 仅 `lanhuapp.com`（**http 与 https 两条都要**）与 `http://127.0.0.1/*`，不触达其他站点
+
+### 为什么 lanhuapp.com 需要 http 与 https 两条
+
+Chrome 判断扩展能否读一条 Cookie 时，按该 Cookie 的 `Secure` 标志拼 URL 再匹配 `host_permissions`：Secure 的按 `https://`，非 Secure 的按 **`http://`**。蓝湖的会话 Cookie 里只有 `PASSPORT` 是 Secure，`user_token` / `session` / `SERVERID` 都不是——只声明 https 时，`chrome.cookies` 会**静默**只返回 `PASSPORT` 一条，复制出来的 Cookie 不足以通过 `lanhu auth test`。删掉 http 那条即复现此问题。
 
 ## 安全提示
 

ecosystem/browser-extension/public/manifest.json

@@ -11,7 +11,11 @@
     "128": "icons/icon128.png"
   },
   "permissions": ["cookies", "clipboardWrite"],
-  "host_permissions": ["https://*.lanhuapp.com/*", "http://127.0.0.1/*"],
+  "host_permissions": [
+    "https://*.lanhuapp.com/*",
+    "http://*.lanhuapp.com/*",
+    "http://127.0.0.1/*"
+  ],
   "background": {
     "service_worker": "background.js",
     "type": "module"

ecosystem/browser-extension/src/background/index.ts

@@ -1,13 +1,17 @@
 import {
   collectCookieHeader,
   DEFAULT_BRIDGE_PORT,
+  parseDocumentCookie,
   sendCookieHeader
 } from '@lanhu-context/ecosystem-core';
 import type { BackgroundMessage, BackgroundReply } from '../shared/protocol';
 
 async function handle(message: BackgroundMessage): Promise<BackgroundReply> {
   try {
-    const token = await collectCookieHeader(chrome.cookies);
+    const token = await collectCookieHeader(
+      chrome.cookies,
+      parseDocumentCookie(message.pageCookie ?? '')
+    );
     if (message.type === 'copy-cookies') return { ok: true, token };
 
     const result = await sendCookieHeader(fetch, DEFAULT_BRIDGE_PORT, token);

ecosystem/browser-extension/src/content/index.ts

@@ -8,17 +8,24 @@ import { ask } from './messaging';
 // All user-facing behaviour (menu items, wording, toasts) lives in
 // ecosystem-core; this file only adapts the extension's message channel. The
 // cookie work itself happens in the service worker — chrome.cookies is not
-// available to content scripts.
+// available to content scripts — but document.cookie is only readable here, so
+// it rides along and the worker merges both sources.
 const platform: MenuPlatform = {
   copyText,
   async readCookieHeader() {
-    const reply = await ask({ type: 'copy-cookies' });
+    const reply = await ask({
+      type: 'copy-cookies',
+      pageCookie: document.cookie
+    });
     if (!reply.ok) return { ok: false, error: reply.error };
     if (!reply.token) return { ok: false, error: '返回为空' };
     return { ok: true, token: reply.token };
   },
   async sendCookieHeader() {
-    const reply = await ask({ type: 'send-cookies' });
+    const reply = await ask({
+      type: 'send-cookies',
+      pageCookie: document.cookie
+    });
     return reply.ok ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, error: reply.error };
   }
 };

ecosystem/browser-extension/src/shared/protocol.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,12 @@
+/**
+ * `pageCookie` carries the content script's own `document.cookie`. The service
+ * worker cannot read it (no DOM), and chrome.cookies has been observed coming
+ * back narrower than the page's own jar, so the two are merged before the
+ * header is built.
+ */
 export type BackgroundMessage =
-  | { type: 'copy-cookies' }
-  | { type: 'send-cookies' };
+  | { type: 'copy-cookies'; pageCookie?: string }
+  | { type: 'send-cookies'; pageCookie?: string };
 
 export type BackgroundReply =
   | { ok: true; token?: string }

ecosystem/ecosystem-core/src/__tests__/bridge.spec.ts

@@ -17,6 +17,27 @@ describe('collectCookieHeader', () => {
     const getAll = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]);
     await expect(collectCookieHeader({ getAll })).rejects.toThrow('NO_COOKIES');
   });
+
+  it('merges in page cookies the privileged query missed', async () => {
+    // Observed in the wild: chrome.cookies returned only PASSPORT while the
+    // page's own jar held the rest of the session.
+    const getAll = vi
+      .fn()
+      .mockResolvedValue([{ name: 'PASSPORT', value: 'FAKE1', path: '/' }]);
+    await expect(
+      collectCookieHeader({ getAll }, [
+        { name: 'sid', value: 'FAKE2' },
+        { name: 'uid', value: 'FAKE3' }
+      ])
+    ).resolves.toBe('PASSPORT=FAKE1; sid=FAKE2; uid=FAKE3');
+  });
+
+  it('still yields a header when only the page has cookies', async () => {
+    const getAll = vi.fn().mockResolvedValue([]);
+    await expect(
+      collectCookieHeader({ getAll }, [{ name: 'sid', value: 'FAKE' }])
+    ).resolves.toBe('sid=FAKE');
+  });
 });
 
 describe('sendCookieHeader', () => {

ecosystem/ecosystem-core/src/__tests__/cookies.spec.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
-import { formatCookieHeader, sortCookies } from '../cookies';
+import { formatCookieHeader, mergeCookies, sortCookies } from '../cookies';
 
 describe('formatCookieHeader', () => {
   it('joins name=value pairs with "; "', () => {
@@ -68,3 +68,42 @@ describe('sortCookies', () => {
     expect(input[0]?.name).toBe('root');
   });
 });
+
+describe('mergeCookies', () => {
+  it('adds names only the page knows about', () => {
+    // The regression this guards: a privileged query that comes back with one
+    // entry must not shrink the header below what the page itself would send.
+    const merged = mergeCookies(
+      [{ name: 'PASSPORT', value: 'FAKE1', path: '/' }],
+      [
+        { name: 'PASSPORT', value: 'STALE' },
+        { name: 'sid', value: 'FAKE2' }
+      ]
+    );
+    expect(merged).toEqual([
+      { name: 'PASSPORT', value: 'FAKE1', path: '/' },
+      { name: 'sid', value: 'FAKE2' }
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('keeps the privileged value on a name clash', () => {
+    // chrome.cookies/GM_cookie carry path and HttpOnly entries; the page copy
+    // is the weaker record.
+    const merged = mergeCookies(
+      [{ name: 'sid', value: 'PRIVILEGED' }],
+      [{ name: 'sid', value: 'FROM_PAGE' }]
+    );
+    expect(merged).toEqual([{ name: 'sid', value: 'PRIVILEGED' }]);
+  });
+
+  it('falls back to the page list when the privileged one is empty', () => {
+    expect(mergeCookies([], [{ name: 'sid', value: 'FAKE' }])).toEqual([
+      { name: 'sid', value: 'FAKE' }
+    ]);
+  });
+
+  it('is a no-op without page cookies', () => {
+    const privileged = [{ name: 'sid', value: 'FAKE', path: '/' }];
+    expect(mergeCookies(privileged, [])).toEqual(privileged);
+  });
+});