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fix(security): close remaining SSRF (CWE-918) call sites via shared URL validator#6520
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…ch remaining SSRF call sites (CWE-918)
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[WIP] Fix SSRF vulnerability in additional serializers
fix(security): close remaining SSRF (CWE-918) call sites via shared URL validator
Jul 27, 2026
liuruibin
marked this pull request as ready for review
July 27, 2026 10:21
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Seems you are using me but didn't get OPENAI_API_KEY seted in Variables/Secrets for this repo. you could follow readme for more information |
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PR #6455 fixed SSRF in
application.pyby replacingstartswith()prefix checks with properurlparse-based validation, but left 6 identical vulnerable call sites unpatched acrosstools/serializers/tool.py,tools/serializers/tool_workflow.py, andknowledge/serializers/knowledge_workflow.py.Changes
New shared utility:
apps/common/utils/url_validator.pyvalidate_trusted_url(url, allowed_hosts)—urlparse-based validator: requireshttpsscheme, exact hostname allowlist match, rejects userinfo (user:pass@host) and explicit portsALLOWED_DOWNLOAD_HOSTS = {"apps-assets.fit2cloud.com"}ALLOWED_CALLBACK_HOSTS = {"apps.fit2cloud.com"}apps/application/serializers/application.py_validate_trusted_url/_ALLOWED_*definitions with imports from the shared module (behavior unchanged)apps/tools/serializers/tool.pystartswith()inCreate.insert,AddStoreTool.add, andUpdateStoreTool.update_tool(download + callback)UpdateStoreTool.update_tool's callbackrequests.getwas completely unguarded — addedvalidate_trusted_urlcheck andallow_redirects=Falseapps/tools/serializers/tool_workflow.pyandapps/knowledge/serializers/knowledge_workflow.pystartswith()checks withvalidate_trusted_url; addedallow_redirects=Falseto all affectedrequests.getcallsBefore / After
The pickle deserialization sink in
tool.py(RestrictedUnpickler(...).load()) is fed from the download response, making the unpatched call sites particularly high severity.