fix(node): gate GET /ipfs/{cid} tree objects so a withheld subtree's structure can't leak (#135) - #173
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fix(node): gate GET /ipfs/{cid} tree objects so a withheld subtree's structure can't leak (#135)#173beardthelion wants to merge 121 commits into
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughPath-scoped IPFS visibility now applies to blob and tree objects using caller-specific reachable allow-sets. CID resolution uses ChangesPath-scoped object visibility
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant Caller
participant IPFSHandler
participant Database
participant VisibilityPack
participant GitRepo
Caller->>IPFSHandler: Request CID
IPFSHandler->>Database: Resolve CID through pinned_cids
Database-->>IPFSHandler: Candidate Git OIDs
IPFSHandler->>VisibilityPack: Compute caller blob or tree allow-set
VisibilityPack->>GitRepo: Enumerate reachable commits and paths
GitRepo-->>VisibilityPack: Reachable object paths
VisibilityPack-->>IPFSHandler: Allowed object OIDs
IPFSHandler-->>Caller: Serve object or return 404
Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~60 minutes Possibly related issues
Possibly related PRs
Suggested labels: Suggested reviewers: 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 5✅ Passed checks (5 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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🧹 Nitpick comments (2)
crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/ipfs.rs (1)
143-209: 🚀 Performance & Scalability | 🔵 TrivialThe blob/tree gating, memo selection, and fail-closed arms look correct.
One operational note:
/ipfs/{cid}is reachable anonymously, and under path-scoped rules each request against an object that exists in a repo triggers a full-history reachability walk (onegit ls-tree -rztper reachable commit, plus the root-tree pass for trees). The memo is request-scoped only, so a spray of valid blob/tree CIDs against a large-history repo re-runs the walk on every request. Consider a bounded cross-request allow-set cache (keyed by repo id + head oid + caller) and/or rate limiting on this route to cap the cost.🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate. In `@crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/ipfs.rs` around lines 143 - 209, Mitigate repeated full-history walks in the /ipfs/{cid} path by adding a bounded cross-request cache for computed blob/tree allow-sets, keyed by repository ID, current head OID, object type, and caller identity; invalidate or naturally bypass entries when the head changes. Implement this around allowed_blob_set_for_caller, allowed_tree_set_for_caller, and the existing memo lookup, and consider adding rate limiting for anonymous requests to further cap abuse.crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/visibility_pack.rs (1)
391-416: 🚀 Performance & Scalability | 🔵 Trivial | ⚡ Quick winAvoid
ARG_MAXinroot_tree_pairs.Passing every reachable commit to
git logonargvscales with history size and can fail on very large repos. When that happens, the tree CID path for path-scoped rules skips the repo and the object falls through to a 404. Feed the commits over stdin instead (git log --stdin --no-walk=unsorted --format=%T).🤖 Prompt for AI Agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate. In `@crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/visibility_pack.rs` around lines 391 - 416, Update root_tree_pairs to avoid placing all commit IDs in argv: invoke git log with --stdin alongside --no-walk=unsorted and --format=%T, write the commits joined by newlines to the child process stdin, and handle stdin/command errors consistently with the existing context and status checks. Remove the argument expansion of commits while preserving the existing tree-pair parsing.
🤖 Prompt for all review comments with AI agents
Verify each finding against current code. Fix only still-valid issues, skip the
rest with a brief reason, keep changes minimal, and validate.
Nitpick comments:
In `@crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/ipfs.rs`:
- Around line 143-209: Mitigate repeated full-history walks in the /ipfs/{cid}
path by adding a bounded cross-request cache for computed blob/tree allow-sets,
keyed by repository ID, current head OID, object type, and caller identity;
invalidate or naturally bypass entries when the head changes. Implement this
around allowed_blob_set_for_caller, allowed_tree_set_for_caller, and the
existing memo lookup, and consider adding rate limiting for anonymous requests
to further cap abuse.
In `@crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/visibility_pack.rs`:
- Around line 391-416: Update root_tree_pairs to avoid placing all commit IDs in
argv: invoke git log with --stdin alongside --no-walk=unsorted and --format=%T,
write the commits joined by newlines to the child process stdin, and handle
stdin/command errors consistently with the existing context and status checks.
Remove the argument expansion of commits while preserving the existing tree-pair
parsing.
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crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/ipfs.rscrates/gitlawb-node/src/git/visibility_pack.rscrates/gitlawb-node/src/test_support.rscrates/gitlawb-node/src/visibility.rs
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I found issues that need to be addressed before this is ready.
Findings
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[P1] Make the CID tests and lookup use the identifier published by the pin path
crates/gitlawb-node/src/test_support.rs:2064
These new assertions requestcid_for_oid(...), whose multihash is a Git object ID. The real pin path instead storesCID(sha256(raw object content)), andgl ipfs getsends that stored CID back to this handler. Even with SHA-256 Git repositories those values differ because Git hashes"<type> <len>\\0" + content;get_by_cidtherefore treats a real pinned CID as a nonexistent OID and returns 404 before this new tree gate runs. Please make the serving lookup use the same CID-to-object mapping as pinning (or make the two identifiers deliberately identical), and cover a CID produced from the fixture object's raw bytes rather than encoding its OID. -
[P2] Do not pass the complete history as
git logarguments
crates/gitlawb-node/src/git/visibility_pack.rs:395
root_tree_pairsadds every reachable commit to the process argv. On a long history this exceedsARG_MAX(about 32k SHA-256 OIDs on a 2 MiB limit), so spawninggit logfails; the handler treats that walk error as a denial and returns 404 even to an authorized caller requesting a reachable/root tree. Please complete CodeRabbit's pending root-tree request by feeding commit IDs throughgit log --stdinor by batching/root-resolving them during the existing per-commit traversal.
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#135) get_by_cid treated the CID's sha2-256 digest as a git oid and cat-file'd it, but a real pin CID digests the raw object content (Cid::from_git_object_bytes), not the framed git object, so every pinned CID 404'd before the #135 tree gate could run. Resolve the incoming CID to its oid through the pinned_cids table (new Db::oid_for_cid + idx_pinned_cids_cid) and gate on that oid; a CID never pinned here is an opaque 404, uniform with a genuine not-found and a visibility denial. The tree-gate tests now build the request CID the way the pin path does (pin_cid_for: read raw bytes, Cid::from_git_object_bytes, record_pinned_cid) instead of from the oid, so they exercise the gate on a production CID rather than an identifier that never occurs. RED before the serve fix (the served-object assertions 404), GREEN after. Also feed root_tree_pairs' commit set to 'git log --stdin' on stdin instead of argv: a long history overflowed ARG_MAX, failing the walk, and the caller fail-closed 404s an authorized reader of a reachable/root tree. Oids are written from a separate thread while the main thread drains stdout, so large input and output cannot deadlock on the pipe buffers; a scale test over 2500 commits guards it. Resolves jatmn's P1 and P2 on #173.
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The index was appended to the v1 bundle, which is recorded once in schema_migrations and then skipped, so a node already past v1 would never create it. Move it to a new v11 migration and add an upgrade-path test that drops the index plus its migration record and asserts run_migrations() recreates it. Follow-up to jatmn's P1/P2 on #173; addresses INV-7 caught in pre-push review.
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Both addressed as of P1 (CID → object mapping). You're right that the lookup and the tests diverged from the pin path. P2 (git log argv). Rebased onto main. |
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PR3 of the #62 served-git hardening stack (timeout #165 and teardown wiring #150 are merged). A bounded semaphore caps how many upload-pack / receive-pack / info-refs operations run at once; past the cap a request is shed with a clean 503 + Retry-After before spawning another git subprocess, instead of exhausting the PID/thread table. A permit is acquired at the top of each of the three handlers and held for the whole op, releasing on return. The cap is a portable backstop: the compose pids_limit is absent on Fly, whose 500-connection cap is a different axis. Size --max-concurrent-git-ops (GITLAWB_MAX_CONCURRENT_GIT_OPS, default 128) below the process budget. Range 1..=1_048_576 so 0 (shed everything) and an oversized value that would panic tokio's Semaphore at boot are clean CLI errors. Known gap, tracked separately: info/refs and the withheld-blob (upload_pack_excluding) path are not duration-bounded and do not reap their git child on client disconnect, so a hung git on those two paths holds its slot until it exits and live git can briefly exceed the cap. The main pack path (run_git_service) tears its group down on drop. Tests: Overloaded maps to 503 + Retry-After; the config knob defaults and rejects out-of-range; git_permit sheds at capacity and releases; and each of the three endpoints sheds with 503 when the semaphore is exhausted (load-bearing: drop the permit line and the endpoint test goes red).
Add max_concurrent_git_pushes (default 32) and max_concurrent_reads_per_caller (default 16), both clap range(1..=1_048_576) so an oversized value is a clean CLI error, not a Semaphore::new boot panic. The per-caller knob documents that per-source-IP keying is only as granular as GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY. Wiring lands in the following commits; these are the config surface for the #174 concurrency-fairness fix. Resolves jatmn P1a/P1b groundwork on #174.
git-receive-pack now draws from a separate git_write_semaphore (max_concurrent_git_pushes) instead of the shared pool, so a flood of anonymous reads can no longer shed an authenticated push at admission (jatmn P1a). The shared field is renamed git_read_semaphore and continues to gate upload-pack and both info/refs advertisements. The write permit stays above acquire_write so it precedes the Tigris fresh-acquire (INV-10). Handler-layer tests: write-pool shed (503), and a cross-boundary proof that an exhausted read pool does NOT shed a push; both mutation-checked (routing receive-pack back to the read pool flips each RED). 497 tests pass. Part of #174.
Adds PerCallerConcurrency, a bounded-keyed in-flight limiter (distinct from the request-rate RateLimiter) so no single caller monopolizes the served-git read pool. Each caller (per-DID when signed via optional_signature, else per-source-IP via client_key) may hold at most max_concurrent_reads_per_caller concurrent reads; over that it sheds 503. The key map is self-bounding (a key is dropped when its in-flight count hits zero) with a reject-before-insert max_keys backstop so a key farm can't grow it (INV-15). Applied in git_upload_pack and both info/refs advertisements, acquired after the visibility gate so a denied request never consumes a slot (KTD7). Primitive unit-tested (cap + self-bounding + reject-before-insert) and mutation-checked. Handler-layer SC2: same-caller sheds while a different caller passes, proven on BOTH git_info_refs and git_upload_pack with independent mutation probes; plus a None-key bypass test. Per-source-IP keying is trust-config dependent, documented on the config knob. 502 tests pass. Part of #174.
info_refs ran a bare Command::output() with no timeout and no process-group teardown, so a hung git pinned its concurrency slot indefinitely and a client disconnect orphaned the child (jatmn P1b). Extract the timeout + process_group(0) + KillGroupOnDrop core from run_git_service into a shared drive_git_child, and route info_refs through it with an injectable git_bin. A hung advertisement now aborts with GitServiceTimeout (mapped to 504); disconnect reaps the group. run_git_service's teardown tests all pass through the shared core (proving the group teardown info_refs inherits), the real-git filter tests cover the advertisement happy path, and a new watchdog-bounded test proves a hung advertisement times out. 503 tests pass. Part of #174.
The filtered-pack path ran the whole rev-list + pack-objects build inside a spawn_blocking, so an outer tokio timeout could not cancel the blocking thread and a client disconnect orphaned the git child while the permit freed (jatmn P1b, the second gap path). Split it: rev-list enumeration stays blocking off the runtime (rev_list_keep), but the streaming pack-objects stage now runs under the shared drive_git_child on the async side, so it is duration-bounded (GitServiceTimeout -> 504) and its process group is reaped on disconnect. build_filtered_pack becomes async and takes a git_bin seam + timeout; upload_pack_excluding threads the git_service_timeout through. A watchdog-bounded test proves a hung pack-objects times out (rev-list fast, pack-objects hangs). The refactor's happy path is covered by the existing filtered-pack correctness and real-git partial-clone/fetch tests, all still green; disconnect/group-teardown is the shared drive_git_child code proven by the run_git_service tests. 504 tests pass. Part of #174.
#62) The max_concurrent_git_ops and git_service_timeout_secs doc-comments (and .env.example) described the info/refs and withheld-blob paths as unbounded follow-up gaps. Both are now closed (#174): the comments reflect the read/write pool split, the per-caller sub-cap, and that every capped path is duration-bounded with process-group teardown. Verified the pattern-doc pre-ship checklist: every git_permit / write-permit / per-caller site holds only a timeout+teardown git path, and all three size knobs are range(1..=1_048_576). Closes the #174 work. No behavior change.
Review of the served-git concurrency cap found no P0/P1; these are the verified P2 follow-ups. config: the max_concurrent_git_ops doc overclaimed that "every capped path is duration-bounded." The rev-list object enumeration in the withheld-blob path still runs in an uncancellable spawn_blocking, so a stuck rev-list can hold its slot until git exits. Scope the guarantee to the streaming stages and name the residual. Also tighten the fairness claim: the receive-pack advertisement shares the read pool (a shed advertisement is a cheap retryable GET); only the push POST is on the isolated write pool. api/repos: add info_refs_per_caller_cap_keys_on_did_not_ip, the missing handler proof that a signed caller is keyed by its DID, not its source IP. Filling the DID slot sheds a request from a free IP; collapsing read_caller_key to its IP arm turns the assertion green-not-503 (mutation-verified RED). api/repos: extract acquire_read_caller_permit so both read handlers share one shed path instead of a duplicated match block. rate_limit: recover from a poisoned PerCallerConcurrency mutex instead of panicking. The critical section is pure counter arithmetic and cannot poison the lock, but a panic there would brick the limiter for every caller. 505 tests pass; clippy -D warnings and fmt clean. Part of #174.
The read-pool knob was referenced by the push and per-caller entries' comments but had no example line of its own, so operators couldn't discover it from the template. Add it with the config default (128).
…ng enumeration can't pin a git permit (#174)
…ID (#174) read_caller_key returned the authenticated DID when a caller signed, dropping the source-IP key. Public read routes accept any valid did:key via optional_signature with no admission step, so one host could mint N disposable DIDs and hold max_concurrent_reads_per_caller slots under each, multiplying its budget N-fold and filling the global read pool, while the same host unsigned was capped on its IP. Key the read sub-cap on the resolved source IP for every caller, signed or not, mirroring the push path's IpRateLimiter which already throttles on source IP for this exact DID-farm reason. Drops the now-unused caller_did parameter at both call sites (git_info_refs, git_upload_pack). Inverts info_refs_per_caller_cap_keys_on_did_not_ip into info_refs_per_caller_cap_keys_on_ip_not_did: fill one source IP's slot, then two requests signed under different DIDs from that same IP both shed 503 (farm defeated), while a signed request from a different IP keeps its own budget. RED on the DID-keyed tree, GREEN after.
) git_info_refs acquired git_read_semaphore for BOTH services, so the push handshake (GET /info/refs?service=git-receive-pack) competed in the global read pool. An anonymous clone flood could exhaust that pool and shed a legitimate push with 503 during its required advertisement phase, before it ever reached git_write_semaphore on the POST. The write pool exists precisely so anonymous reads cannot shed an authenticated push, but only the POST drew from it. Select the pool by service: the receive-pack advertisement (phase one of a push) now draws from git_write_semaphore, like the git-receive-pack POST, so a saturated read pool cannot starve it. The per-IP push_rate_limiter that already brakes the advertisement stays as the anti-flood control, and the advertisement stays reader-visible with no new auth requirement. Because the receive-pack branch is now a write-path op, it no longer consumes a read per-caller slot. Handler-layer proofs: with the read pool at zero the receive-pack advertisement survives while the upload-pack advertisement sheds; with the write pool at zero the receive-pack advertisement sheds while upload-pack is unaffected; and a receive-pack advertisement from an IP whose read per-caller budget is full still gets through (mutation-checked, RED when the skip is neutralized).
…#174) The withheld-blob classification walk (blob_paths) fanned out blocking git children with no deadline and no process-group teardown: git for-each-ref, git cat-file, git rev-list, a git ls-tree per commit, and an uncounted git rev-parse (via store::head_commit). A hung or pathologically slow child pinned the caller's served-git permit for the whole hang, and on client disconnect the spawn_blocking task and its git children ran on, orphaned. blob_paths is the shared core of five callers: the upload-pack serve path (holds a read permit) AND, inside git_receive_pack, the post-push replication and encrypt-then-pin walks (hold the write permit U2 reserves for pushes). So the same unbounded walk could pin either pool, and leaving the write-side twin unbounded would have made U2's reservation a claim that does not match behavior. Bound every git child at the blob_paths spawn seam on the blocking side: each child runs in its own process group with a watchdog thread that SIGTERMs (then SIGKILLs) the group on one shared deadline spanning the whole walk, and retains admission until the group is reaped. This is the blocking-side counterpart of smart_http::drive_git_child (spawn_blocking cannot be cancelled by an async timeout). blob_paths stays sync, so all five callers keep their signatures and the 32 classification tests are unchanged; because every caller funnels through blob_paths, one seam bounds both the serve and replication paths. The previously unbounded store::head_commit child becomes a bounded git rev-parse inside the walk. A walk that hits its deadline carries GitServiceTimeout, which the serve handler now maps to 504 rather than a generic 500. Proof: a fake git that hangs on rev-list makes blob_paths return GitServiceTimeout within the watchdog budget (not block on the child) and the recorded process-group leader is reaped, not orphaned; neutralizing the watchdog kill makes it hang past the budget (RED). The 32 real-git classification tests stay green through the refactor, including detached-HEAD, non-standard-ref, and deleted-in-history cases.
GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS bounds the info/refs advertisement too: smart_http::info_refs drives it through drive_git_child under this timeout, with a passing test proving the 504. The old note claimed it does not. It also claimed the withheld-blob path is unbounded; after the blob_paths seam bound (this PR) the walk is bounded and reaped, by a fixed internal deadline rather than this env var, so the line now states that precisely instead of overclaiming this setting covers it.
Code review found run_bounded_git's watchdog could return a spurious 504 and signal a recycled process group. The watchdog runs off a wall clock on its own thread; done_tx.send() only fires after child.wait() reaps the leader, so a walk that finished within microseconds of the deadline took the watchdog's Timeout branch, discarded a fully-captured successful result, and returned GitServiceTimeout (a 504 for a walk that actually completed). Worse, the Timeout branch SIGTERMed -pgid unconditionally after the leader was reaped, so a recycled pgid could be signalled, the exact hazard smart_http guards via disarm-after-wait. Set a reaped AtomicBool the instant the main thread reaps the child; the watchdog checks it before every kill and stands down if the leader is already reaped. Gate the timeout verdict on !status.success(), so a child that exited on its own is never reported as a timeout even if the watchdog fired late. Add the survived-SIGKILL warn smart_http's reap already emits, for operator visibility on a wedged (D-state) git. The hung-walk test stays green (a killed child exits by signal, not success, so it still surfaces GitServiceTimeout and reaps the group) and the 32 real-git classification tests stay green (a fast walk is never spuriously killed).
…nnot starve the write pool (#174) U2 moved the receive-pack info/refs advertisement onto git_write_semaphore to keep an anonymous read flood from starving the push handshake. But the advertisement is anon-reachable on public repos and holds its write permit across the slow acquire_fresh Tigris download, and the only per-source brake on it was the push RATE limiter, not a concurrency cap. So a multi-source flood of receive-pack advertisements could hold the write pool's slots across those downloads and shed authenticated pushes (both the advertisement and the owner-gated git-receive-pack POST draw from the same pool). U2 thus introduced the first anonymous consumer of the write pool the state doc promised anon could never reach; the plan's residual note (no worse than the POST) was wrong, because the POST is owner-gated and the advertisement is not. Add git_push_advert_per_caller, a per-source concurrency sub-cap on the receive-pack advertisement keyed on the resolved source IP (the same PerCallerConcurrency mechanism U1 uses for reads), sized to an eighth of the write pool so a single source holds at most that share and saturating the pool takes many distinct source IPs, each also braked by the per-IP push rate limiter. The upload-pack advertisement keeps its read-pool per-caller cap; the owner-gated POST is unchanged. Correct the state doc for git_write_semaphore accordingly. Handler-layer proof: a source at its receive-pack advertisement cap sheds 503 (RED before the acquisition, 500-not-503), while a different source and the upload-pack advertisement are unaffected. Full suite 510 green.
…d timeout (#174) Close the reasoned-not-run gaps from the code review by making the walk's git binary and timeout injectable, then driving the missing branches with a real handler and a fake git instead of reasoning about them. - Add state.git_bin and *_bounded variants of the walk entry points taking (git_bin, timeout); the served handlers (upload-pack serve, receive-pack replication and full-scan and encrypt-pin, and the ipfs gate) now pass the operator-configured GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS, so the whole walk is bounded by the same budget as the other served-git ops rather than a fixed constant. The git_bin-less wrappers stay for the real-git classification tests. Newly vetted by execution (not reasoning): - receive-pack replication path is bounded: replication_withheld_set with an injected hung git returns within the budget and fails closed, so it cannot pin the write permit git_receive_pack holds across it. - a hung withheld-blob walk on the upload-pack POST returns 504 (real handler, real repo on disk, injected hung git), proving the GitServiceTimeout -> git_service_app_error wiring end to end. - the watchdog status-gate: a child that exits successfully is not reported as a timeout even when the watchdog fired (mutation-checked: drop the guard -> RED). - SIGKILL escalation: a SIGTERM-ignoring child is still reaped via SIGKILL and the group is gone; a truly uninterruptible D-state child (unreapable by any signal) is the documented residual, matching the async teardown. - the advertisement per-source cap sizing never derives 0. Full gitlawb-node suite 515 green.
…a fixed const (#174) Follow-up to threading the configured timeout into the walk: the walk now honors GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS on both the serve and replication paths, so the README no longer says a fixed internal deadline.
The key is logged as the `repo` field on the lease waiter-cap shed and the steal-bound warning (state.rs), and it was joined with a NUL. Those are the two messages an operator reads to find a contended repo, and a NUL-hostile log sink truncates the field at the separator, rendering two different repos' warnings identically. Before this PR that field was a UUID or a mirror id, both printable, so the NUL was a regression this change introduced. Join with '/' instead. It cannot occur in the owner slug by construction - the slug is owner_did.replace([':','/'], "_") - and it mirrors the shape of the disk path the key exists to reproduce. A test asserts the key carries no control characters so this cannot regress silently. Rotating the U2 lease test's row to a UUID id is not incidental: the mirror path that seeds it uses 'owner_short/name' as the row id, which now coincides with the identity key and would leave the test unable to tell the two keys apart. The rotated id is also the real shape of the bug. Re-verified RED against the reverted call site after the change.
The post-receive tail was spawned after `guard.release(...)`, which on a successful push awaits the Tigris upload and then the advisory unlock while the handler future is still tied to the client connection. The pack has already landed on disk by then, so a disconnect in that window left a durable push whose pins, recovery copy and announce were never spawned: the dropped tail F2 closed, one step earlier in the handler. Spawn it above `release`, gated on an explicit `receive_result.is_ok()`. The `?` below the spawn can no longer be what keeps a rejected push from pinning and announcing a half-applied repo, so the success check is now a named flag that `release` consumes too. The tail is read-only on the repo directory and holds neither the lease nor the advisory lock, so overlapping it with the upload waits on nothing the handler still owns. Tests: a handler-level disconnect driven through a parked `release` (new store-level test seam), plus the must-not direction, a failed receive-pack that spawns no tail. The U5 source gate now binds the new boundary: spawn inside `if push_succeeded`, above `guard.release(push_succeeded)`.
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…branches v12 was main's current_max + 1, which INV-7a says is necessary and not sufficient: the runner keys the applied set on the integer alone, so a version another in-flight branch also claims is skipped in full on whichever side merges second. No error, no warning, schema_migrations still reading healthy, and the column simply absent, after which dequeue_pending_syncs fails on every poll and sync ingestion stalls. Two open branches already claim into that range. #135/#173 holds through 14 (15 once it rebases past main's v11) and #253 took 16. 17 clears both, and the reservation is recorded in a comment so the next author can see it. Gaps are harmless; the runner iterates the array and never requires contiguity. Not doing the other half here. INV-7a's load-bearing rule is the name check that makes the silent skip impossible rather than merely unlikely, and that lands with #253 on test/replay-guards-253; adding it on this branch would collide with that work.
…k case A handler-level "the next acquire_write succeeds" check does not discriminate: it still passes with the RepoWriteGuard::Drop backstop disabled. Measured with the backstop off, the lock is held at the drop and reads free about two seconds later from a session outside the pool. #[sqlx::test] builds its pool with idle_timeout(1s), so the guard's connection is reaped once the handler future drops it, the session ends, and postgres frees the lock with no help from the code under test. acquire_write retries for far longer than that window, so it waits the release out and reports success either way. write_guard_release_cancelled_mid_unlock_frees_the_lock is the real proof: it probes from a connection held out of the pool, 400ms after the drop, inside that window rather than past it.
…oduces Spawning the replication tail above guard.release() also moves it above the Tigris upload, so a ref can be announced while the shared durable copy is still the old one, and a disconnect there cancels the upload while the detached tail still pins and announces. Accepted rather than fixed. Upload-then-announce was never guaranteed: release tolerates a failed upload by design, warning and continuing to the unlock, so an announce over a stale Tigris copy was already reachable before this reorder, and it self-heals through acquire_fresh's local fallback plus the next push. The alternative, detaching release and the tail together, would return 200 before the durable copy lands, which changes the client contract more than the window it closes.
…erve (#62) The path-scoped git-upload-pack branch spent git_service_timeout_secs twice: once on the withheld-blob classification walk, then a second full budget on the serve. One clone could hold a read-pool permit for ~2x the configured budget, which is the occupancy hole this PR otherwise exists to close. Thread one Instant deadline through both phases, mirroring fail_closed_full_scan_objects and build_filtered_pack: the walk runs against the remainder and the serve gets what the walk left, computed after the blocking task's await so it cannot pick up a fresh budget. A walk that consumes the whole budget saturates the serve to zero, which surfaces as GitServiceTimeout -> 504 rather than running unbounded. Under-serving one slow clone is the safe direction versus over-holding the pool. Both serve arms are covered because a fix that reached only the plain arm would leave the ~2x hold reachable by any clone of a repo that actually withholds a blob. Each test was observed RED before the change (status 200, the serve completing on a fresh budget) and GREEN after, and reverting the filtered arm alone flips only its own test, so neither guard is a proxy for the other. The knob's meaning changed for this path, so .env.example now says the value bounds the two phases combined rather than each separately.
…ed caps (#62) Four prose corrections on this PR's surfaces, no behavior change. The receive-pack advertisement no longer draws from the write pool, it draws from a dedicated advert pool, but five comments still described the old shape: the info/refs per-source block, the cap construction in main.rs, the State field doc, and a test doc plus its assertion message. The state.rs and main.rs ones mattered most because they contradicted the operator text being written in this same commit. The /ipfs probe and content-read subprocesses each run under their own deadline now (the lesser of git_service_timeout_secs and the remaining budget, reaped by process-group teardown), but four surfaces still claimed they had no duration bound past the pre-start budget check. The correction stays scoped rather than declaring the route safe: the probe's object_store_readable check is a synchronous filesystem sweep with nothing to reap, so a wedged filesystem can still hold the walk slot past the deadline, and that residual is now stated where the old warning used to be. A grep for the full phrase misses two of these surfaces, since one wraps across doc-comment lines and one says "duration clamp" instead, so the sweep uses the fragment. Both push-side per-source concurrency caps are derived as max_concurrent_git_pushes / 8 with a floor of 1 and have no environment variable, so neither was documented anywhere an operator reads. The write-side one is load-bearing for push availability: it is acquired before the global write permit, and owner enforcement defaults off, so without it one host minting disposable did:key identities could monopolize the write pool. They are described in .env.example beside the read cap rather than in README's table, which is keyed by variable name. The hung-walk assertion in visibility_pack printed {err}, showing only the top anyhow context and dropping the underlying io error. A beta-lane failure surfaced as "failed to spawn git for-each-ref" with no errno, which made it undiagnosable. {err:#} prints the chain. The underlying flake is still undiagnosed: it did not reproduce in 123 local runs and the stable lane passed on the same commit, so this only improves the next occurrence.
…hanges (#62) Two table rows needed correcting for the changes in this PR: the GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS row now says the classification walk and the pack serve share one deadline on the path-scoped upload-pack path, so the value bounds them combined; and the GITLAWB_IPFS_REQUEST_BUDGET_SECS row no longer claims the probe and content-read subprocesses are unbounded, while keeping the object-store-readability sweep named as a live residual. The other thirteen changed lines are punctuation only, no wording changes: em dashes replaced with colons, commas, or sentence breaks, and one pair of curly quotes straightened. The repo's prose-style hook validates a whole file rather than a diff, so these pre-existing characters were rejecting every edit to README.md, including the two rows above.
… deadline (#62) The shared deadline computed the walk's budget on the async side, before the task was queued on the blocking pool. withheld_blob_oids_bounded starts its own clock when it actually runs, so a budget measured at queue time handed the walk a full budget from whenever the pool got to it: the read permit was held for queue delay PLUS the budget, and only the serve phase saw the outer deadline already spent. Computing the remainder inside the closure charges that delay against the shared deadline, which is what makes the ~1x bound in the docs true rather than approximate. Not a regression from the previous commit (the old code passed a constant git_timeout, so the delay went uncharged there too, and the combined hold was queue delay plus two full budgets), but the claim this PR now prints in README and .env.example should be exact. The two shared-deadline tests still pass and still fail on revert; they cover the budget arithmetic, not the queue-saturation path. Reproducing that needs a runtime with the blocking pool pinned and parked, which the sqlx::test harness does not give a seam for, so the queue-delay path is reasoned, not executed.
) The absent-CID path disambiguates a clean `missing` by re-running the probe, but the re-probe took the same deadline with no check that any budget was left. A first probe that nearly exhausted the budget still spawned a second child that could only be reaped, and the watchdog's SIGTERM grace plus SIGKILL settle carried the whole call to roughly twice the budget. Measured on object_type_bounded with a 1s budget and a probe that burns 0.9s of it: two spawns and 2021ms elapsed. That is the same ~2x occupancy shape this PR exists to remove, on a different handler, and it is worse here than on the served-git path: /ipfs/{cid} carries only optional_signature, and an absent CID drives this branch once per repo, so an unauthenticated caller spraying well-formed absent CIDs pays the overshoot per repo. It also degraded an honest absence into a retryable 503. Re-probe only when the remaining budget covers what the first probe actually took, since the re-probe runs the same command. Below that, taint to Transient rather than spawn: an inconclusive disambiguation is not an absence verdict, so it must not become a false 404 either. The same 1s case is now one spawn and finishes inside the budget. Both introduced by this PR (d39fc8d, the F5 disambiguation); neither object_type_bounded nor the re-probe exists at the merge base, so this is not a pre-existing condition. The companion test pins that an ample budget still re-probes, so the check cannot silently disable the disambiguation it guards.
Brings the branch onto post-#243 main so cargo metadata --locked passes against the committed tree.
…ish (#174) pin_new_objects runs under a pin_semaphore permit and that pool defers rather than sheds. Both sinks in ipfs_pin.rs built a bare reqwest::Client::new(), which carries no timeout, so a silent endpoint parked the pool indefinitely. Both now use the shared no-redirect client from build_http_client() through a module-local OnceLock, rather than the hand-rolled twin its docstring forbids. The client alone does not bound the hold: without a ceiling the loop is O(N) with N chosen by the pusher. A 120s batch budget is taken once at loop start and gated at the top of every iteration, so no object's work begins with zero budget left. The remainder is also passed to each add as a per-request timeout, which is what lets one large healthy upload run past the client's 10s default without letting the batch run forever. RequestBuilder::timeout replaces the client value for that request only and leaks nothing to other callers, verified by execution against the pinned reqwest. An earlier version of this commit classified a dead endpoint by reqwest::Error::is_timeout() || is_connect() and broke the batch. That was wrong in both directions and is gone. It missed the ordinary dead-peer shapes, since a peer closing mid-request yields IncompleteMessage and a peer RST mid-upload yields ConnectionReset, both observed with is_timeout and is_connect false, so a load-balancer idle timeout evaded it entirely. And it fired on a slow but alive endpoint, because .timeout() is a total deadline covering body upload, so a healthy multi-megabyte add was read as a dead endpoint and abandoned the rest of the push. A wall-clock bound needs neither judgement. The docstring now states what is bounded and what is not, rather than implying the hold is closed. Not bounded: the git read, since store::read_object shells two bare Command::output() calls with no timeout or process-group reaping and this loop does not run it under spawn_blocking; the DB round-trips; and the pool itself, since the Pinata replication task holds the same semaphore across a full git re-derivation with no deadline. Truncation is stated plainly: a batch stopped at the deadline leaves the rest unpinned and nothing sweeps them up, so recovery is opportunistic through a later full-scan push. Tests written first, both RED by assertion rather than by a harness timeout: pin_new_objects_stops_the_batch_at_its_deadline ... FAILED the batch must stop partway, not pin all five and not stall on the first: pinned 5 pin_new_objects_does_not_abandon_the_batch_on_a_slow_but_alive_endpoint ... FAILED a slow but progressing endpoint must pin both objects: an upload past the client's 10s default is not a dead endpoint left: 1, right: 2 Both guards mutation-proved load-bearing against present-but-wrong mutants, each red on its own message: the loop-top break widened to continue, and the per-request timeout replaced with None. Also bounds encrypted_pin.rs's pin_git_object call, where a hang wedged a repo's EncryptInflight key. Its Drop backstop covers unwind, not hang. Full suite 730 passed, 0 failed. fmt and clippy clean.
The walk's deadline clamp was computed on the async side, before spawn_blocking was called, then used inside the closure. Time spent queued for a blocking thread went uncharged, so the walk ran with a budget larger than the request's true remainder. The clamp is now derived inside the closure at task start. This is the sibling of the upload-pack site fixed in 28a6ca4, and unlike that one it sits on the anonymously reachable route. A queue delay that eats the whole remainder saturates the clamp to zero and the bounded walk fails closed through the existing taint arm, no verdict, which is the safe direction. Testing gap, recorded at the site rather than papered over: the queue-delay path is reasoned, not executed. Observing it needs a runtime with the blocking pool pinned and parked, and the sqlx::test harness gives no seam for that. 28a6ca4 shipped with the same gap for the same reason, verified against its diff and message rather than assumed. The tests in this file saturate the admission semaphores, never the blocking pool, so there was nothing to reuse. An assertion on the arithmetic would only restate the implementation. cargo test ipfs::: 24 passed, 0 failed.
…#174) separator_prevents_the_owner_name_boundary_collision asserted that ("a","b_c") and ("a_b","c") produce different keys. Those differ under any join at all, bare included (ab_c against a_bc), so deleting the separator from repo_identity_key left the test green. It could not fail for the reason it named. The inputs are now ("a","bc") against ("ab","c"), both abc under a bare join. The test docstring said the separator was \0; the code joins with /. Corrected. The docstring on repo_identity_key itself carried the same wrong collision example, so it is corrected too. Proven by mutation rather than argued, joining with no separator: old inputs, injected, re-running ... still green VACUOUS the guard's own defect was injected and nothing failed 0/1 load-bearing new inputs, injected, re-running ... red, on the expected message LOAD-BEARING matched 'owner/name boundary must not be ambiguous' 1/1 load-bearing Separator restored, no mutation residue. All 6 repo_identity_key_tests pass.
…#174) advert_per_caller_cap_sizing_is_never_zero opened with a local closure re-implementing (pushes / 8).max(1), so it bound nothing. Production derives that expression twice, and the second site was added after the test was written. per_source_push_cap now lives in rate_limit.rs next to PerCallerConcurrency, the type the value feeds, and both main.rs sites and the test call it. The finding was confirmed by execution before the fix. Deleting .max(1) from both production sites with the closure still in place: injected (2 sites), re-running ... still green VACUOUS the guard's own defect was injected and nothing failed 0/1 load-bearing And after, deleting .max(1) from the helper: injected (1 site), re-running ... red, on the expected message LOAD-BEARING matched 'advert cap must be >= 1 for pushes=1' 1/1 load-bearing The first attempt at that second proof came back RED-WRONG-REASON against 'minimum write pool must derive cap 1, not 0': the loop's assertion for pushes=1 fires first and aborts before that line is reached. Same property, earlier assertion. No mutation residue. Test green, fmt and clippy clean.
The pinata_object_list_for_refs docstring said a visibility tightening that lands after tail-start is covered by the reconciliation sweep. No such sweep exists; state.rs says so directly, that a dropped job would be lost forever precisely because there is none. The claim is dropped and nothing replaces it. An earlier draft wanted to substitute a next-push claim, which no site establishes either, and swapping one unbacked claim for another is the same defect. Four pre-existing sites make the same claim (repos.rs:30, push_delta.rs at 8, 189 and 281 with warns at 349 and 358). They predate this PR and are left for a follow-up rather than widening a nine-round diff.
…ing lacks (#174) Both new comments said saturating the pool takes ~8 distinct source IPs, each also rate-limited. Neither half holds for an IPv6 caller with a routed /64: the sub-cap and the rate limiter both key on rate_limit::client_key, which with TrustedProxy::None falls through to the full peer address with no prefix folding, so one caller has 2^64 keys. max_keys does not compensate, since keys are freed on permit drop and live keys never approach the 100,000 default. The comments now say what the cap actually bounds, concurrent slots per resolved client key, and name the residual. The keying fix stays deferred as a design call, and that deferral is defensible: full-IP keying predates this PR, so these caps help IPv4 and single-address callers without regressing anything. Landing a comment that overstates the guarantee is not defensible, in a round that corrects a weaker overclaim one screen away. The per_source_push_cap docstring added earlier in this round repeated the same claim, so it is corrected here rather than shipping fresh. Comments only, no behaviour change. check, fmt clean.
…rors (#174) Review finding from jatmn, round nine. RepoWriteGuard::release closes the connection when pg_advisory_unlock returns Err (F3b): the await resolved, so the session is alive and still holds the lock, and returning that connection to the pool hands the next caller a lock nobody tracks. The Drop backstop carried the same hazard and only logged. Both arms are fixed. The spawned detached unlock now closes the connection through close_conn_bounded on the error path, instead of letting the async block end and return it to the pool. The off-runtime arm was worse than the finding described. It dropped an already-taken connection with no unlock attempted at all, and this turned out to panic rather than leak: PoolConnection::drop calls rt::spawn for its return-to-pool task, whose no-runtime fallback panics with "this functionality requires a Tokio context". So any off-runtime guard drop panicked in a destructor today. It now detaches, which gives up the pool slot and yields a plain PgConnection whose drop closes the socket, ending the session that holds the lock. Drop cannot await, so detach is the whole disposal available here. Confirmed against the vendored sqlx 0.8.6 source rather than assumed, and min_connections is 0 everywhere in this repo. Three tests, modeled on the release F3b cases, on a pool with the idle reaper disabled so a reaped session cannot pass the assertion for us. Observed RED first: write_guard_dropped_off_runtime_disposes_the_connection ... FAILED panicked at sqlx-core-0.8.6/src/pool/connection.rs:208: this functionality requires a Tokio context then: dropping a write guard off a Tokio runtime must not panic write_guard_drop_with_failing_unlock_does_not_return_the_connection ... FAILED timed out waiting for the connection whose detached unlock errored to be closed rather than returned to the pool still holding the session lock write_guard_drop_with_successful_unlock_keeps_the_connection ... ok The success case is green on both sides on purpose: it is the must-not case, so it only ever catches a widening of disposal onto the healthy path. GREEN after, and all 12 guard tests pass, so the release coverage did not regress. Both new guards mutation-proved load-bearing, each red on its own message, 2/2. Full suite 729 passed, 0 failed. fmt and clippy clean.
…ing it (#174) GITLAWB_GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS accepts every positive u64, so deriving the per-repo write-lease steal bound as `* 2 + 60` panics every push in a debug build across the top of the accepted range, and in release wraps to a short Duration that would let a waiter steal a live push's lease. Saturating keeps the knob's documented meaning: a timeout that large means the service bound is effectively off, so the steal bound should be effectively infinite rather than tiny. The regression drives git_receive_pack rather than the arithmetic, so the call-site wiring is what is under test. RED before at repos.rs:1733 with "attempt to multiply with overflow", GREEN after; re-confirmed load-bearing by reinstating the unchecked expression.
…n represent (#174) Tracing the lease-bound overflow to its other consumers turned up a worse instance of the same defect. This PR routed git_service_timeout_secs into build_filtered_pack and blob_paths, and both build a deadline as `Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(..)`. That addition panics on overflow in RELEASE as well as debug, so a large-but-accepted value crashes the serve path rather than merely disabling a timeout. Hardening each arithmetic site as it is found would leave the next one open, so the bound goes where the value enters: clap now rejects anything above 365 days at parse time, which keeps every derived duration in range at once and fails fast at boot instead of at the first path-scoped clone. A year is many orders of magnitude above any real clone or push, so it remains the practical way to disable the bound. The test pins both derivations at the maximum and rejects the value one past it and u64::MAX. RED when the upper bound is dropped from the value_parser.
…ot tidiness (#174) A second-model pass on the previous two commits caught an upgrade footgun in the first and stale prose in the second. The 365-day ceiling was tighter than the defect required. The help text has always told operators to set this very large to disable the bound, and clap accepted every positive u64, so values like 999999999 (~31 years) are working production "off" settings that neither overflow `* 2 + 60` nor exceed an Instant deadline. A node running one of those would have failed to start after this upgrade, over a value that was never the defect. The ceiling moves to 100 years, which clears every such setting and stays an order of magnitude under the ~584-year limit of a u64-nanosecond Instant, the tightest representation on any platform we build for. Every value that worked before still parses; only the ones that would have panicked are rejected. The test now pins the pre-existing disable values alongside the rejections so the distinction cannot quietly regress. Clamp-and-warn was the suggested remedy and is not what landed: it would keep accepting a value the node cannot honor and silently substitute a different one, where the range says what is representable and fails fast, matching how every other bound in this file behaves. The lease-bound comment and its test still described the pre-ceiling world. Both now say what is true, and the test deliberately keeps u64::MAX rather than moving to the ceiling as suggested: Config is reachable by direct construction, and at the ceiling the arithmetic does not overflow, so a test pinned there would pass with the saturation removed and prove nothing. Re-confirmed load-bearing after the rewording.
ipfs_request_budget_secs parsed range(1..), so every positive u64 was
accepted, but get_by_cid derives the request deadline as
Instant::now() + Duration::from_secs(that). That addition is an explicit
overflow check rather than a debug-only one, so an oversized value aborts
every /ipfs/{cid} request in a release build instead of setting a very
long budget. The route is anon-reachable, so an operator typo is felt
publicly.
Reuse GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS_MAX, the ceiling the sibling knob already
carries: the bound is representability, not a policy view of a sane
budget, so the large "set it very large to disable" values operators were
told to use still parse. Reject rather than clamp, matching the other
bounds in this config.
Execution evidence:
- RED before the change: the new test failed with "3153600001 is past the
representable ceiling and must be rejected at parse time" while its
disable-value assertions passed, so the test is not vacuous in either
direction.
- GREEN after: config::tests 13 passed, including the sibling
git_service_timeout regression test.
Sweep for the same defect class, re-run with a widened shape because the
original grep missed a site. Passes: Instant::now() sites; from_secs()
fed by config fields; config fields reaching a Duration through an
arithmetic expression; config fields reaching a tokio timer constructor.
The arithmetic and timer passes each return exactly one hit,
heartbeat_interval_hours (config.rs 150, main.rs 916, operator.rs 161),
which has no range at all and multiplies by 3600 before the Duration.
That knob is a separate defect on a path this branch does not touch, so
it is recorded for a follow-up rather than widened into here. Every other
Instant addition derives from the already-bounded git_service_timeout_secs
or from a constant.
The pin pool's docs claimed it bounded "how many MB-scale lists are held at once across all repos". It does not. On the local IPFS path the caller materializes the object list before pin_new_objects_gated acquires, so a task parked waiting for a permit is still holding its full list, and how many tasks park is capped only per repo by EncryptInflight. Across distinct repos that retained memory is unbounded, which is the gap a reviewer raised against this claim. Correct the claim at each site rather than implying the pool closes an exposure it cannot see. The pool does bound concurrent pin loops, and therefore lists held while being pinned; that part was always true and is kept. The residual is now named where each claim lives, including on the config knob, so an operator does not read the knob as a memory cap it cannot deliver. Bounding the retention is a real change to the capture shape (the Pinata twin already avoids it by acquiring before it derives) and is not attempted here. Sites corrected: pin_new_objects_gated's docstring and its F2b empty-list comment, the empty-list test's docstring, AppState::pin_semaphore and AppState::encrypt_inflight field docs, the max_concurrent_pin_tasks knob doc, and the construction comment in main. Sweep over pin_semaphore, F6, and "held at once". Left alone with reason: ipfs_pin.rs 16/31/174-200/518 describe the loop that genuinely holds the permit, so their claims are about hold duration and are true; repos.rs 1029-1036 and 2276-2294 describe the Pinata path, which acquires before materializing, so its "at most pin_semaphore permits' worth exist at once" holds; repos.rs 5898 claims concurrent loops are bounded, which is the true concurrency claim; the F6 hits in api/ipfs.rs are that file's own review numbering for walk-permit ordering, unrelated to this pool; constructions and test fixtures carry no claim. No behavior change: the diff is comments and docstrings only, checked by filtering the diff for non-comment lines.
The three handler peeks said they shed "before any DB/disk work", which reads as an admission bound on the DB window. It is not one. The peek holds no permit, and permits are only held from the authoritative acquire below, after the visibility and rate gates, so a burst arriving while permits are free all proceeds into the DB and none of it sheds. What the peek actually gives is a cheap 503 for one request once the pool has ALREADY filled, sparing that request's DB work. The gate ordering that makes it a peek is deliberate and stays: a denied or rate-limited request must consume no slot, and one source must not hold global slots through the DB/visibility window. Reordering to bound the window would undo that. So this corrects the claims and changes no behavior; bounding the DB window would need an admission mechanism the peek is not. test_support.rs's receive-pack docstring additionally called the peek "the permit" and "the first statement". Both were wrong at this head: it is a non-holding peek, and the authoritative write-pool acquire sits after the per-repo lease. Corrected along with the shed claim. The "remove the block and this goes red" sentences stay, since those tests drive an already-saturated pool, which is the case the peek does handle. Sweep over "before any DB", "before DB", "pre-DB". Left alone with reason: api/ipfs.rs:142 describes a HELD walk-admission acquire, so its claim is true; graphql/mutation.rs:201 and test_support.rs:528 are about auth ordering, unrelated; the repos.rs test docstrings at 4194/4213/4556/ 4618/4682 describe test mechanics against a saturated pool, which is the case the peek delivers. No behavior change: the diff is comments and docstrings only, checked by filtering the diff for non-comment lines.
…perator docs
Review round on the three preceding commits.
The knob's doc said a value past the ceiling "aborts every /ipfs/{cid}
request in a release build". That is wrong, and three reviewers plus an
outside model landed on it independently: the ceiling is 100 years, the
Instant addition does not actually overflow until roughly 584 years on a
u64-nanosecond Instant, so values in between are representable and are
rejected as a deliberate safety margin, not because they panic. Reworded
to say that, since a confidently wrong comment is worse than the vague
one it replaced.
Also on the knob:
- GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS_MAX has two consumers now, so its own doc says
so, and notes this knob derives only the Instant addition and not the
lease-steal multiply.
- The "clears every disable setting" phrasing overclaimed: u32::MAX sits
above the ceiling. Now names the documented sentinels instead.
Operator-facing docs: the sibling knob's ceiling commit updated both
README.md and .env.example in the same change, and this one had not. Both
now carry the accepted range, matching that precedent.
House style: five comment lines added by the preceding commits used em
dashes, which this project does not allow. Four were carried over from the
text being edited and one was copied from the sibling test. All replaced.
Checked mechanically over the added lines rather than by eye.
Two comments restated an argument in full immediately after pointing at
the canonical site for it. Trimmed to the pointer plus the local delta.
Scoping correction worth recording: the two preceding commits claimed "no
behavior change". That holds for repos.rs, state.rs, main.rs and
test_support.rs, but a config.rs field doc IS clap --help output, so the
pin-knob doc edit changes operator-visible help text. No runtime behavior
changes either way.
Verification: full suite 733 passed, fmt clean, clippy clean under the CI
form. The range guard was separately proven load-bearing in both
directions by mutation: reverting to range(1..) goes RED on the rejection
assertions, and tightening the ceiling to 500_000_000 goes RED on the
disable-value assertions.
Known residual, not fixed here: the bound is parse-side only, so a Config
built by direct construction rather than through clap can still hold an
unrepresentable value.
…agnitude Both doc comments describing GIT_SERVICE_TIMEOUT_SECS_MAX said the 100-year ceiling sits "an order of magnitude" under the ~584-year limit of a u64-nanosecond Instant. The real margin is 3,153,600,000 seconds against 18,446,744,074, a factor of about 5.85. An order of magnitude means ten. Worth noting how it spread, since the fix is trivial and the pattern is not. The phrase was written once on the constant, then copied into the ipfs_request_budget_secs doc by the commit that was at that moment correcting a different false claim in the same file. Nobody re-ran the division at either site, because quoting an existing sentence feels like citation rather than assertion. The direction of the error is the part that matters: a vague "well under" would have been true and would have invited a reader to check. The precise-sounding "order of magnitude" was false and discouraged checking. Comments only; the diff carries no executable line, checked by filtering it for non-comment changes. fmt and clippy clean under the CI form.
Reconciles the served-git concurrency cap with the /ipfs CID tree gate. The two branches independently reworked the same three seams, so most of this is picking one mechanism per seam rather than taking a side per file. /ipfs walk admission: keeps this branch's provenance-first resolver and its lazy legacy scan, but drops the detached serve task in favour of #174's shared Arc<WalkAdmission>, cloned into each spawn_blocking. Both close the permit-release bypass; the Arc does it without leaving an abandoned request's full legacy scan running against a held slot. Ported in with it: the request-budget gate at all four stages with each child deadline clamped to the remainder, the walk timeout computed inside the closure so queue delay is charged, taint sources in place of a single truncated flag, and the deterministic-fault 500 gated on nothing else having tainted. The two per-request ceilings are now composed rather than one shadowing the other. The visit ceiling was unwired by the merge and the walk cap answered to only one of the two knobs; both are honoured, the tighter one winning. Object probe: object_type_bounded takes a Duration and returns ProbeError, so this branch's call shape keeps #174's absence-vs-unreadable-store discriminator. A clean `missing` from cat-file is byte-identical whether the object is absent or the pack is unreadable, and the discriminator is store readability, not git's wording. Write lock: the advisory-lock pool's after_release hook does not cover an unlock that errors on a live session. Measured: a poisoned connection returned to the pool still held the lock 15s later, because the hook's own unlock_all fails the same way. So the guard now disposes of that connection, in release and in the Drop backstop. Post-push replication goes to #174's coalescer. This branch's requeue_faults integration suite has no equivalent seam on that design and is not carried over; it is recoverable from the pre-merge head. Also clamps the provenance path's three per-source lookups to the request budget. They run while the walk permits are held, which is the stall hazard the preload clamp already covered, and the structural guard found them because it now requires every occurrence to be wrapped instead of assuming exactly one. 1346 tests pass across the workspace; fmt and clippy are clean under --locked. The four re-anchored structural guards were mutation-tested and all four go red on the defect they name.
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This head is the #174 integration merge, not a new round of fixes. Both branches had independently reworked the same seams, so the merge was mostly a choice of mechanism rather than a choice of file. The four worth knowing about:
Two per-request ceilings came out of the merge half-wired. Write lock. I first took this branch's lock-pool Object probe. Two things worth flagging rather than burying. This branch's Verified on this head: 1346 tests pass across the workspace, |
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What
GET /ipfs/{cid}servedtreeobjects of a withheld subtree to callers denied that subtree. A git tree body is<mode> <name>\0<raw-oid>per entry, so fetching the tree CID of a withheld directory returned every child filename and child oid in cleartext, recursively. Blob content was already protected; this closes the structure leak so the CID surface matches whatget_treeenforces on the REST path.Approach
Tree objects are now gated against a caller-aware allowed-tree-set, the mirror of the existing
allowed_blob_set_for_caller:object_pathswalk (git ls-tree -rztper reachable commit) thatblob_pathsand the newtree_pathsboth filter, so the two gates cannot drift.blob_pathsoutput is byte-identical, so its callers are unaffected.tree_pathsis thekind == "tree"slice plus each reachable commit's root tree (resolved in onegit log --format=%Tpass, sincels-treenever emits a commit's own root).get_by_cidgates ablobagainst the allowed-blob-set and atreeagainst the allowed-tree-set (lazy per repo, off the async runtime, fail-closed on any walk error). Commits and tags stay served: they expose only root-level metadata the caller already cleared the/gate for.The withheld directory's own tree (path
/secret) is denied, not just its descendants, so parity withget_treeholds.Reachability and scope
get_by_cidresolves a CID by treating its sha256 digest as a git oid, which only matches in sha256 repos; production repos currently init--object-format=sha1, so the endpoint is largely dormant until a sha256 migration. This lands the gate ahead of that. The replication/pin path exports the same withheld-tree structure to IPFS independently of the object format and is the more urgent sibling, tracked separately in #172.Tests
Deny paths driven through the real handler:
get_tree).blob_pathsoutput is asserted byte-identical after the walk refactor.Closes #135.
Summary by CodeRabbit
New Features
/ipfs/{cid}to resolve via pinned CID → git-object OID mapping with visibility-aware tree handling.Bug Fixes
Tests
Chores