Repository navigation
chore(security): add ReversingLabs malware scan workflow - #2882
Merged
Merged
Conversation
Contributor
Author
|
@auth0/project-dx-sdks-engineer-codeowner please review the files in the PR. This automated security-hardening workflow is untested in this repo — before merging, confirm it triggers and passes (and is not silently ignoring failures); do not merge on a green result alone. |
Contributor
Author
|
An internal service ticket has been filed for the owning team to review and merge this PR. |
This was referenced Nov 2, 2026
cschetan77
force-pushed
the
security/add-malwarescan
branch
from
November 2, 2026 12:56
f8be7bd to
e0b03f8
Compare
cschetan77
approved these changes
Nov 3, 2026
cschetan77
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 3, 2026
### Changes Switches the `install` target in the `Makefile` from `npm install` to `npm ci`. `make install` decides which dependency versions end up in the bundle built for publishing. `npm install` can resolve newer versions than the lockfile pins and rewrite `package-lock.json` if it is out of sync with `package.json`. `npm ci` installs exactly the tree pinned in the lockfile, verifies integrity hashes, and fails on any mismatch. The GitHub release workflow (`npm-publish` action) already uses `npm ci`. This pins the build's dependencies to the reviewed lockfile. It does not by itself make the bundle byte-identical across environments (Node/npm versions can still differ). ### References Found while reviewing #2882 (ReversingLabs scan workflow) and working out how the npm and CDN artifacts are built. ### Testing * `npm ci` passes locally against the current lockfile. * If the lockfile ever drifts from `package.json`, the install step will now fail instead of silently resolving new versions. * [ ] This change adds unit test coverage * [ ] This change adds integration test coverage * [ ] This change has been tested on the latest version of the platform/language ### Checklist * [x] I have read the [Auth0 general contribution guidelines](https://github.com/auth0/open-source-template/blob/master/GENERAL-CONTRIBUTING.md) * [x] I have read the [Auth0 Code of Conduct](https://github.com/auth0/open-source-template/blob/master/CODE-OF-CONDUCT.md) * [x] All code quality tools/guidelines have been run/followed * [ ] All relevant assets have been compiled
cschetan77
added a commit
that referenced
this pull request
Nov 3, 2026
…lease (#2910) Wires the ReversingLabs scan from #2882 into the release flow so a failed scan blocks publishing. ### Changes - `rl.yml`: drops the placeholder build step and the artifact inputs. It now builds like the `npm-publish` action does (`npm ci --include=dev --ignore-scripts`, `npm run build`), then packs and scans two artifacts with the `rl-scan` action: - the npm tarball (`npm pack`) - a tarball of `build/` (the CDN bundle: `lock.min.js`, `lock.js`, locale files, source map) A final step fails the job unless both scans report `success`, since the action reports a missing artifact through its output without failing the step. The only input is `node-version`; the version comes from `package.json`. - `npm-release.yml`: new `rl-scan` job that calls `rl.yml`, the `release` job now has `needs: rl-scan`, so nothing is published, tagged or released unless the scan passes. Declares the 8 scan secrets and forwards them with `secrets: inherit`. - `release.yml`: passes the 8 scan secrets through to `npm-release.yml`. The scan job builds the artifacts and the release job builds again. This is intentional, to keep the scan separate from the publish step. ### References - #2882 (automated ReversingLabs workflow PR) * [ ] This change adds unit test coverage * [ ] This change adds integration test coverage * [ ] This change has been tested on the latest version of the platform/language ### Checklist * [x] I have read the [Auth0 general contribution guidelines](https://github.com/auth0/open-source-template/blob/master/GENERAL-CONTRIBUTING.md) * [x] I have read the [Auth0 Code of Conduct](https://github.com/auth0/open-source-template/blob/master/CODE-OF-CONDUCT.md) * [x] All code quality tools/guidelines have been run/followed * [ ] All relevant assets have been compiled
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
✏️ Changes
This pull request adds a security hardening workflow. No functional changes are introduced.
ReversingLabs Malware Scan
This PR adds
.github/workflows/rl.yml. It is a reusable workflow (workflow_call) that wraps the okta-approvedauth0/devsecops-tooling/.github/actions/rl-scanaction.Steps to wire it up
rl.ymlwith all steps that produce your artifact at theartifact-pathyou pass — toolchain setup, dependency install, compile, and package.artifact-pathmust be a concrete file — the action's[ -f ]check rejects globs/directories and a missing path fails the job.Required org secrets — all 8 must be present
The
rl-scanaction declares all 8 as required inputs — if any is missing or empty the scan job fails. Confirm each is available to this repo (set at theauth0/org level) before merging:RLSECURE_LICENSE,RLSECURE_SITE_KEY— ReversingLabs license + site keySIGNAL_HANDLER_TOKEN,SIGNAL_HANDLER_DOMAIN— scan telemetry auth + endpointPRODSEC_TOOLS_ARN— AWS IAM role assumed via OIDC (see below)PRODSEC_TOOLS_USER,PRODSEC_TOOLS_TOKEN,PRODSEC_PYTHON_TOOLS_REPO— private ProdSec Python index creds + URLAWS OIDC trust — required, not just a secret
The action authenticates to AWS by assuming
PRODSEC_TOOLS_ARNvia GitHub OIDC (no static keys), so two things must be in place:id-token: write(mints the OIDC token) andcontents: read. Removingid-token: writebreaks the AWS step.Configure AWS credentialsfails even with every secret set — an infra change the repo/org owner must arrange before merging.🟠 Declining this workflow
This is an organization-enforced security-hardening workflow, so closing this PR is not enough — the tool treats a plain close as a discard and opens a fresh replacement PR on its next run.
To permanently decline this category, a maintainer must close this PR and add one of these labels to it:
remediation: not-requiredremediation: not-applicableApplying a label requires write, triage, or admin access, so the label is a trusted maintainer signal. Once a closed PR carries one of these labels, the tool respects the decline and will not reopen a replacement.
🔮 Type of Change
🔗 References
This change applies a standard automated security-scanning workflow as part of routine repository hardening.
📖 Documentation
No user-facing changes have been introduced.
🎯 Testing
remediation: not-applicable.🚀 Deployment
🔥 Rollback
Reverting this PR removes the added workflow file — no further action required.