[Wbhhh996]

Summary

Fixes #479 — working_directory allows shell command injection in run_command.

The working_directory argument was interpolated into a single-quoted shell fragment (cd '<cwd>' && <cmd>) without escaping quote characters. A caller-controlled path containing a single quote could close the cd argument early and append arbitrary shell commands.

Changes

• Added escape_cwd_single_quotes() helper in terminator-rs (shared by both call sites)
• Unix shells (bash/sh/zsh): single quotes escaped as '\'' (close-quote, escaped-quote, reopen)
• PowerShell (powershell/pwsh): single quotes doubled ('')
• cmd.exe: double quotes stripped from the path (legal Windows paths cannot contain ", so this only affects malicious input and neutralizes it)
• Applied the fix in both call sites: Desktop::run() (crates/terminator/src/lib.rs) and the MCP run_command handler (crates/terminator-mcp-agent/src/server.rs)

Verification

• cargo check -p terminator-rs ✅
• cargo check -p terminator-mcp-agent ✅
• cargo test -p terminator-rs --lib escape_cwd_tests ✅ 2/2 passed
  • unix quote escaping (/tmp/a'b → /tmp/a'\''b)
  • powershell quote doubling (C:\a'b → C:\a''b)

Notes

• Behavior for paths without quote characters is unchanged.
• The cmd.exe branch already wrapped the path in double quotes; stripping embedded " preserves that for all legal Windows paths.